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Research as to how humans group natural kinds, such as animals, is essential to 
understanding categorization processes. However, it lacks conventional application and 
generalization to everyday life. Humans are social beings that encounter a wide array of 
individuals on a daily basis. In these situations, we are required to consider various 
properties that make up these people. As Keller (2005) suggests, the way we categorize is 
shaped by our theories about the world. Therefore, when we determine the rationale 
behind people’s social categorization processes, we are better able to understand people’s 
perceptions of their social environment. Moreover, when we conduct scientific research 
on how people categorize race, we gain substantial information about their perceptions 
and understanding of race. Thus, the goal of the present study was to determine how and 
to what extent people categorize race and if they use the principles of psychological 
essentialism to do so.  
In order to determine if people tend to essentialize race in a similar manner as 
other natural kinds, the third study of the Hampton, Estes, Simmons (2007) research was 
replicated. In Study 1 and Study 2, undergraduate participants were obtained from 
Western Kentucky University’s psychology study board. In Study 1, participants were 
presented with transformation stories in which an animal or person came to look and act 
like another animal or person as a result of either mutation or maturation. Approximately 
one-half of the participants received scenarios that included information about the 
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exemplar’s offspring. Approximately one-half received scenarios that excluded this 
information. Additional transformation stories that described changes to artifacts and the 
body (i.e. weight and hair length) were added as filler items. Participants rated the 
artifact/animal/person’s typicality, category membership, and their level of confidence in 
their ratings. In addition, they provided justifications for their responses. In Study 2, 
transformations were described as being the result of unintended or intended changes. In 
Study 2, one-half of the scenarios included a statement that the animal or human’s 
offspring resembled the initial state, I. One-half of the scenarios included a statement that 
the animal or human’s offspring resembled the final state, F. Participants rated the 
artifact/animal/person’s typicality and category membership. They were also asked to 
provide justifications for their responses. 
This study provides further support for the belief of race as a natural kind given 
that subjects were more likely to essentialize race than animals. The study also suggests 
that people view race differently than other factors related to appearance (i.e. hair length 
and weight). In both studies, the majority of subjects were willing to state that a person 
changed if their hair or weight changed; however, they were unwilling to indicate a 
person could change their race. Furthermore, the justification data obtained in the study 
was one of the first studies to differentiate the reasoning used by those who did and did 
not essentialize animals and race. 
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I. 
Introduction 
Humans have a natural tendency to place things they encounter into categories 
(Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Markman, 1989). By classifying things, whether they are 
objects, animals, or humans, into categories, people can significantly lessen their 
cognitive load. Categorization often provides a quick, mental “short-cut” for people when 
they encounter new information in their environment. Habituation studies have suggested 
that even infants discriminate between novel category stimuli and categories of stimuli to 
which they have been habituated. This suggests that categorization is an early 
developmental process that begins in infancy. However, as we develop and gain more 
knowledge about the world around us, the way we categorize things often becomes more 
complex.  
Although categorization serves as a cognitive “short-cut”, categorization is not as 
simple as it appears. There are many conflicting theories as to how people categorize 
information. Some theorists have argued that categorization is based on the similarity of 
things (Rips, 1989; Estes, 2003). Specifically, we categorize things by how much they 
resemble members of categories we already know (Estes, 2003). Therefore, we often 
depend upon certain clues (often visual clues such as appearance) to mentally group 
things together.  In addition to similarity, typicality has been considered an important, but 
different, element of categorization (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rips, 1989). Typicality 
suggests that the more an item resembles a specific prototype, the more likely the item is 
believed to belong to the prototype category (Rips, 1989). Unlike similarity, a pre- 
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established category is not needed to group things together. While similarity is based on 
how much one thing resembles another; typicality focuses more on category membership. 
Despite their inherent differences, both typicality and similarity are two forms of 
categorization that tend to focus on grouping things based only on physical features. An 
example of categorization based on similarity was presented by Stepanova and Strube 
(2009). In this study, participants were shown either all color or all gray-scale images of 
males whose skin tone and physical features which ranged from high Afrocentric facial 
physiognomy, low Afrocentric facial physiognomy, to Eurocentric physiognomy. The 
subjects were shown each photo on a computer and rated the attractiveness of the image 
(measurement was not described), the typicality of the image (on a scale of 1, very 
African American to 7, very European American), and a racial categorization task (three-
category judgment: 1, African American, 2, cannot tell, and 3 European American. 
Overall, the Stepanova and Strube (2009) study suggested that when people encounter a 
person with dark skin tone, they tend to classify them as African-American; whereas 
when we encounter a person with light skin tone, we tend to classify them as European-
American. While this study confirms that physical features are an important factor people 
use when categorizing individuals, other studies suggest that other aspects are also 
considered.   
Although physical characteristics are important elements of categorization, 
psychological essentialism is a fundamentally different theory about how people 
categorize things. In contrast to typicality and similarity, psychological essentialism 
suggests that physical features are less important than the “essence” of a thing. 
Furthermore, psychological essentialism requires an individual to analyze deeper, internal 
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properties as well. Gelman (2003) states that essentialism is “deeply ingrained in our 
conceptual systems, emerging at a very young age and across highly varied cultural 
contexts” (p. 6). Furthermore, Gelman (2003) describes essentialism as “a pervasive 
reasoning bias that affects human categorization in profound ways” (p. 6). According to 
psychological essentialism, people's classification of objects is based on the 
psychological belief that objects have internal properties. The person may not know what 
the “essence” of the object is, but believes these internal properties make them what they 
are (Medin & Ortony, 1989; Gelman. 2003). Ultimately, these beliefs are “psychological 
placeholders” that make the object display specific characteristics and traits. For 
example, people may not have knowledge of the internal properties (e.g. biological 
components) of a dog, yet they believe that something within a dog makes it have 
specific physical features and behavior patterns that are different from other animals.  
Research on essentialism has often differentiated things based on two broad 
categories, artifacts and natural kinds. Artifacts can be defined as man-made objects that 
can be categorized by their function. Natural kinds encompass things such as animal and 
human categories that can be categorized by their underlying essence. Natural kinds are 
believed to have hidden, underlying properties that inherently make them what they are. 
However, artifacts are believed to lack these essential properties and are often 
categorized by their function. The theory of psychological essentialism suggests that 
when categorizing natural kinds, one must not only look at the object’s appearance, but 
they may also consider internal properties (“essences”) that make them what they are. 
People may not know what the “essence” is, but acknowledge an underlying property that 
makes the natural kind what it is (Rips, 1989; Estes, 2003). Thus, psychological 
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essentialism is a theory that seeks to explain how and to what extent individuals consider 
a natural kind’s essence to determine category membership.  
A common method for studying psychological essentialism provides research 
participants with scenarios that describe transformations in the external properties of an 
artifact or natural kind; the object’s initial category takes on the properties of a new 
category (Rips, 1989; Glerum, 2002; Wetton, 2006; Hampton, Simmons, Estes, 2007). 
For example, a coffee pot is described as taking on the characteristics and function of a 
birdfeeder (e.g. A person adds holes to a coffeepot, adds wire to hang the coffeepot from 
a tree, and then fills it with bird seed). Participants are then asked to decide whether the 
new object is a member of the initial category or the new category (e.g., "Is this object 
now a birdfeeder or is it still a coffeepot?”). Essentialist thinking is demonstrated by a 
tendency for subjects to deny that the object has changed from its initial category to the 
final category. Research has suggested that by fourth grade, children tend not to	  
essentialize artifact categories, like coffee pots and bird feeders, but essentialize natural 
categories like animals. This finding suggests that even fourth grade children believe 
animals, but not man-made objects, have internal properties that make such “superficial” 
category memberships impossible (Glerum, 2002). Unlike similarity and typicality, with 
psychological essentialism one can conclude that the categorization of animals and 
objects is dependent upon the internal versus external state.  
In a series of studies, Hampton et al. (2007) sought to contrast two essentialist 
theories, causal homeostasis and psychological essentialism. Psychological essentialism 
is based on the concept that one factor can define an essence, while causal homeostasis 
proposes that essences may be determined by a “cause” or several, related factors. These 
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related factors can vary by how much of a property exists within the natural kind. 
(Hampton et al., 2007). In order to differentiate these theories, Hampton et al. created 
transformation stories in which an animal came to look and act like another animal as a 
result of either mutation (i.e. contamination from the environment) or maturation (i.e. 
natural biological processes). Two different transformation stories were used to 
determine if the type of the change affected participants’ willingness to esssentialize 
animals. Psychological essentialism was measured by a participant’s rating of the 
animal’s category membership after the transformation occurred. For example, if a 
participant rated the animal as belonging to the beginning category after the change 
occurred, this rating would suggest the subject believed the animal’s “essence” remained 
the same despite a transformation that changed the animal’s appearance. In contrast, a 
belief in causal homeostasis would suggest that the animal had changed category due to 
actual changes in its essence. Furthermore, the “causal” aspect of causal homeostasis was 
measured by differences in participants’ ratings of typicality and category membership in 
the mutation versus maturation conditions. 	  
In Study 1 and 2, participants were asked to rate either the animal’s typicality (on 
a scale of 1 - initial category to 10 - final category) and assign category membership (on 
a scale of 1 - initial category to 10 - final category in Study 1 in addition to absolute 
membership in Study 2) either before the change or after the change and participants 
were also asked to provide justifications for their responses. In Study 3, participants were 
asked to rate the animal’s typicality (on a scale of 1 - initial category to 7 - final 
category) and assign category membership (either belonging to the initial category or 
final category) before and after the change. Participants were also asked to provide 
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justifications for their responses.  
The results of the first study suggest that before the change occurred in both the 
mutation and maturation conditions, participants were likely to suggest that the animal 
belonged to and was more typical of the initial category. After the change in both the 
mutation and maturation conditions, participants were likely to indicate that the animal 
was typical of the final category but belonged to the initial category. However, in the 
maturation condition, categorization ratings changed less than typicality ratings after the 
change occurred.  A second study was developed to measure the reasons why participants 
disassociated between typicality and category membership. Unlike the first study, 
category membership and typicality were measured between subjects and a new graded 
membership question was added. Hampton et al. (2007) did not indicate how the graded 
membership question was measured. Results of the second study revealed that before the 
change occurred, participants were likely to suggest that the animal belonged to and was 
typical of the initial category. After the change, participants were likely to indicate that 
the animal was typical of the final category and belonged to the final category. In contrast 
to the first study, participants were more likely to assign the animal to the initial category 
in the mutation condition than in the maturation condition.  
In order to further disassociate between typicality and category membership, a 
third study was created. Unlike the previous two studies, participants were asked to 
assign category membership and rate typicality both before and after the change, category 
membership was measured by absolute judgments (being a member of either the initial 
category or final category), and a confidence rating was added to measure how sure the 
participant was of their choice. In addition, similarity was measured (on a scale of 1 - 
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initial category to 7 - final category) and participants received scenarios that either 
included or excluded information that described the animal’s offspring in an unchanged 
state. 
 Results of their third study suggested that before the change occurred, 
participants were likely to rate the animal as being similar to and being typical of the 
initial category. After the change, participants were likely to rate the animal as being 
typical of the final category and similar to the final category. Unlike the previous studies, 
this pattern of responses was not dependent upon the cause of the change. Thus, the 
researchers were unable to disassociate between ratings of similarity and typicality. In 
addition, they found no further support for an effect of the cause of change (i.e. 
maturation and mutation) on participants’ ratings of typicality and similarity. Hampton et 
al. (2007) suggested that ratings seemed to coincide with the animal’s behavior and 
appearance. As for the results of category membership, before the change, participants 
rated the animal as belonging to the initial category almost all of the time (99%). After 
the change, participants rated the animal as belonging to the final category 84% of the 
time when information about the appearance and behavior of the animal’s offspring was 
provided. When this information about the offspring was excluded, participants rated the 
animal as belonging to the final category 95% of the time. Overall, results of the third 
study suggest that people are willing to believe that animals can indeed change their 
category membership. However, we are unable to determine why people believe category 
membership can be changed. In relation to essentialism, this finding indicates that people 
tend not to essentialize natural kinds as previously expected. Moreover, the majority of 
subjects (84%) failed to essentialize animals even when the participants were provided 
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with information that hinted at a biological “essence” (e.g. an unchanged germline) that 
makes them what they are. In addition, we do not know why this factor ignored by 
participants. While this finding is indeed interesting, and suggests that subjects were 
more likely to use causal homeostasis principles when rating the animals, it also poses 
even more questions about how people essentialize and what information they use when 
categorizing natural kinds.  
Although research as to how we group natural kinds, such as animals, is essential 
to understanding categorization processes, it lacks conventional application and 
generalization to everyday life. It is very rare that we would ever encounter a situation 
where we would need to classify animals into different groups. However, humans are 
social beings that encounter a wide array of individuals on a daily basis. In these 
situations, we are required, often automatically, to consider various properties that make 
up these people. Is the person male or female? Young or old? Black or white? As Keller 
(2005) suggests, the way we categorize is shaped by our theories about the world. 
Therefore, when we determine the rationale behind people’s social categorization 
processes, we are better able to understand people’s perceptions of their social 
environment. Moreover, when we conduct scientific research on how people categorize 
race, we gain substantial information about their perceptions and understanding of race. 
Thus, the goal of the present study was to determine how and to what extent people 
categorize race and if they use the principles of psychological essentialism to do so.  
The concept of race has been investigated by researchers in biological, 
anthropological, sociological, and psychological fields. Despite numerous studies in these 
vastly different academic areas, researchers fail to come to one conclusion about the 
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biological origins of race and how we understand it. Furthermore, the concept continues 
to be a controversial topic in scientific research. While the average person may assume 
race is made of unchangeable, biological components, recent research suggests that race 
is a socially constructed phenomenon (Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003). Cosmides et 
al. (2003) describe genetics research and explain there is more genetic variance between 
members of the same race than between members of different races. Therefore, Cosmides 
et al. (2003) conclude that because race is not based on biological differences, differences 
between races are based on perceived differences determined by society.  
 Although research suggests that race is not biologically based, this finding may 
not prevent people from believing there is an “essence” within a person that makes them 
have specific physical and behavioral attributes of a particular race. Many studies on 
psychological essentialism have looked at essentialist beliefs in relation to objects and 
animals, only a few studies with adult participants have researched essentialism in 
relation to social categories such as race (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Keller, 
2005; Mahalingam, 2007; Bhatia, 2007). Currently, much of the theoretical debate 
remains fixated on whether race is based on genetic and biological components or 
whether race is the construction of the social world (Cosmides et al., 2003). Previous 
techniques used to understand race as a natural kind (e.g. having an “essence”) have 
focused on asking adults general questions about how they categorize race (Haslam et al., 
2000) or questions about genetic determinism (Keller, 2005). Such techniques only 
produce a superficial understanding of race as a natural kind because they lack a 
methodology that is focused on understanding the categorization process. Furthermore, 
methodology such as this leaves very little known about the cognitive underpinnings of 
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adults’ belief about race. Aside from the limited empirical studies on racial categorization 
and essentialism, much of the research on racial essentialism with adult participants is 
philosophically based with no emphasis on the scientific aspects of categorization and 
essentialism (Mahalingam, 2007; Bhatia, 2007). Most of this philosophical research tends 
to focus on the anthropological and sociological aspects of race such as oppression and 
social dominance.  
While qualitative data in relation to essentialism and race is useful, it is even more 
important to measure whether people perceive race as an artifact, a man-made creation, 
or a natural kind based on unseen, biological “essences” in a scientific manner. Haslam et 
al. (2000) sought to determine which social categories were likely to be essentialized (i.e. 
social categories which were believed to have a biological basis). In this study, 40 college 
students rated 20 social categories (e.g. ethnic groups, intelligence groups, age groups, 
personality, physical appearance, etc). Ten items (i.e. directness, uniformity, naturalness, 
stability, inherence, etc.) were provided to measure each of the twenty social categories. 
Nine of the 10 items were used to measure essentialism. An example of an item 
(naturalness) was: “Some categories are more natural than others, whereas others are 
more artificial (‘artificial’ vs. ‘natural’).” Participants rated each of the items on a scale of 
1 to 9. Based on the subjects’ ratings of the 20 social categories, the researchers found 
that gender, race, and ethnicity were the only social categories determined to be natural 
kinds. This finding suggests that people perceive race as an unchangeable trait that may 
have internal properties that give people of a certain race similar characteristics.  
Similar to Haslman et al. (2000), Keller (2005) conducted three experiments with 
undergraduates in Mannheim, Germany to determine the relationship between the 
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biological components of essentialism and social cognition, political attitudes, 
stereotypes, and prejudice. Specifically, Keller (2005) wanted to explore the association 
between people’s tendency to essentialize based on biology and their social and political 
attitudes.  In addition, Keller wanted to create and validate a scale that measured the 
belief in genetic determinism (BGD-scale).This scale was used to measure the extent to 
which subjects believed behavior and personality were caused by genetic factors. To 
validate this scale, 126 undergraduates from the University of Mannheim rated 21 items 
on a scale of 1 - not at all true to 7 - completely true. Items reflected beliefs that 
behaviors and personality are genetic (e.g. “In my opinion, alcoholism is caused 
primarily by genetic factors”). The scale was validated by assessing the discriminate, 
convergent, and predictive validity of the scale. Results indicated that stereotyping is 
related to a person’s tendency to essentialize using biological components.  
In a second study Keller (2005) provided more evidence for the relationship 
between essentialism, stereotyping, and prejudice. In this study, 249 undergraduates (in 
business and social science classes) from the University of Mannheim completed a 
questionnaire that contained items that reflected a belief in the idea that behaviors and 
personality are genetic, modern sexism, racial stereotyping, as well as blatant and subtle 
prejudice. Subjects were also asked to rate social categories (i.e. age groups, gender 
groups, religious groups, etc.) on a variety of features (e.g. uniformity, naturalness, 
stability, etc).  Results of the second study also suggested that participants who were 
higher in social dominance orientation (a tendency to prefer hierarchy in social systems), 
patriotism, nationalism, and Protestant ethic were more likely to hold essentialist beliefs. 
Keller concluded that the belief in biological components of essentialism is associated 
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with negative racial stereotyping, sexism, and prejudice. 
Finally, a third study was conducted to find the causal impact of essentialism on 
prejudice and stereotyping. The third study used 41 students from the University of 
Mannheim. Participants first read an article about genetics in different groups. In the 
second part of the study, participants completed an opinion poll to measure their 
likeability of Eastern European citizens. The third part of the study, required participants 
to complete a questionnaire that included some of the BGD (Belief in Genetic 
Determinism) Scale. Results of the third study suggest that people who hold essentialist 
beliefs show an increased likelihood of prejudice and in-group bias. Ultimately, the 
results of Haslam et al. (2000) and Keller (2005) suggest that people have a tendency to 
believe social categories, such as race, are natural kinds. Furthermore, such results 
indicate that social categories are assumed to be the product of biological components or 
an “essence” that makes them what they are.   
In contrast to these studies with adult participants, several studies have explored 
the process children use to understand race and whether they essentialize race. Studies of 
essentialism involving children have suggested that the use of essentialism in 
categorization is a developmental process. Keil’s (1989; as cited in Gelman, 2003) 
research revealed that as children advance from age five to second grade, they depend 
less on appearance and more on internal properties to categorize natural kinds such as 
animals. As age increased the children’s responses tended to be more essentialist in 
nature. These results suggest that as children grow older they become more aware of the 
internal properties that make natural kinds what they are. With regard to race specifically, 
Hirschfeld (1996; as cited in Gelman, 2003) discovered that children tend to essentialize 
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race when asked about a person’s racial inheritance or growth over time. In Hirschfeld 
(1995; as cited in Gelman, 2003), children were presented with stories about infants of 
one race who came to live with families of another race. When asked what the children 
looked like when they grew older, three-year-old participants responded at chance, but 
four-year-olds knew the child would look like their biological parents instead of the 
adopted parents. Results of this denote a tendency for children to rely on essentialist 
reasoning more often as they grow older.  
In addition to these studies, two studies have studied the essentialism of race by 
presenting children with transformation stories typical of the essentialist paradigm. 
Glerum (2002) and Wetton (2006) presented children ranging from preschool to fifth 
grade with stories describing alterations in objects and medical changes in people and 
animals that caused them to physically transform from one state to another. In the stories 
involving humans, medical procedures were conducted which permanently changed 
people’s physical characteristics from those typical of one race to those typical of 
another. Children were then asked whether the object, animal, or human would belong to 
the initial or final category. Children were also asked if the animal or human’s offspring 
belonged to the initial or final category. Glerum (2002) and Wetton (2006) both 
concluded that, at the most, about a third (38.89% and 34%) of child participants 
essentialized race of the target person. Both Glerum (2002) and Wetton (2006) also 
concluded there was a tendency for children to essentialize offspring who had not 
undergone a direct transformation more than the target person. However, Glerum (2002) 
found that older children were more likely to essentialize race than younger children. 
This main effect of age was not confirmed by the Wetton (2006) study. A main effect of 
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age may not have occurred for Wetton (2006) due to the fact that her subject pool was 
much older than the participants in Hirschfeld (1995; as cited in Gelman, 2003) and 
Glerum (2002). Hirschfeld’s (1995; as cited in Gelman, 2003) participants were three and 
four-years-old and Glerum’s (2002) subjects were preschool, second grade, and fourth 
grade students. In contrast, Wetton (2006) used participants in second/third, fourth, and 
fifth grades. This sample of older children may have decreased an effect of age because 
middle to upper elementary school students rely less on appearance and thus may respond 
in an essentialist manner more often than much younger groups used in Hirschfeld (1995; 
as cited in Gelman, 2003) and Glerum (2002).  
Overall, previous research has shown that, by second grade, children have a 
tendency to	  essentialize natural categories like animals and humans, more than artifact 
categories, like coffee pots and bird feeders (Glerum, 2002; Wetton, 2006). Analysis of 
this data would suggest that children and adults assume there are deeper internal 
components that make the transformation of natural categories (i.e. animals) unlikely 
when compared to the supposed “superficial” transformation of artifacts. Although 
transformation stories are often used to measure one’s tendency to essentialize artifacts, 
animals, and racial categories, using such methods have yielded conflicting results about 
whether people essentialize. Study 1 of Hampton et al. (2007) speaks against essentialism 
while Study 3 presents conflicting findings about the way we essentialize. Ultimately, 
their research suggested that people are more willing to suggest an animal can change 
category membership; thus indicating less willingness to essentialize natural kinds (e.g. 
animals) than previously suggested. Despite conflicting results, using transformation 
studies to understand if and how people essentialize natural kinds appears to be the 
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method most commonly used.    
Unlike previous studies that have examined race, Hampton et al. (2007) used 
transformation stories in which an animal came to look and act like another animal as a 
result of either mutation or maturation. Their results confirmed that the cause of the 
transformation (i.e. mutation vs. maturation) can affect how we essentialize natural kinds. 
In Study 1 and 2, the cause of the transformation led participants to be more likely to 
essentialize in some instances more than others. In Study 1, participants were more likely 
to essentialize in the maturation condition while in Study 2 subjects were more likely to 
essentialize in the mutation condition. However, this effect was not found for Study 3. 
This addition to the transformation studies may be the reason why participants were less 
willing to essentialize natural kinds than previously suggested. Ultimately, the type of 
change (i.e. mutation or maturation) may have affected how the participants perceived the 
actual change within the animal. Overall, by using two types of transformation stories 
like Hampton et al. (2007) we can determine what property or set of properties people 
may use to categorize natural kinds, specifically race. 	  
The present study sought to explain under which conditions and to what extent 
people essentialize race. In addition, the study sought to gain more information about this 
process by obtaining subjects’ justifications for their responses. Furthermore, like the 
Hampton et al. (2007) study, the current study sought to contrast two theories of 
categorization, causal homeostasis and essentialism, specifically in relation to animals 
versus race. Therefore, the basic design of Study 3 in the Hampton et al. (2007) study 
was replicated. Furthermore, I wanted to determine if there is a difference between 
participants’ willingness to essentialize animals and racial categories. While the Hampton 
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et al. (2007) study focused on essentialism only in relation to animals, the goal of the 
present research is to determine if people continue to essentialize when presented with 
human racial categories. Using the examples provided by Hampton et al. in the appendix 
of their article, new stories describing artifact, body, and racial changes were created 
using the same transformation model (e.g. a black person now possesses the 
characteristics of a white person as a result of maturation or mutation). Following the 
same experimental method used by Hampton et al. (2007), each participant was asked to 
rate the category membership and typicality of the entity before and after the 
transformation. In addition, the justifications that are required of each participant 
provided further insight into the how and why people essentialize racial categories and if 
a difference exists between the essentialism of animals and human racial categories. 
Considering that children are more likely to essentialize natural kinds (i.e. animals 
and race) than artifacts (Glerum, 2002; Wetton, 2006), I hypothesized that adult 
participants will tend not to essentialize artifacts and body changes, but will essentialize 
animals and racial categories. Furthermore, since Hirschfeld (1995; as cited in Gelman, 
2003) suggested that four-year-old children acknowledge that offspring would look like 
their biological parents instead of the adopted parents, I hypothesized that adult 
participants will be more likely to essentialize humans and animals when information 
about the exemplar’s offspring is provided. Information about offspring would also 
suggest a biological “essence” that makes the animal or person what it is. In addition, 
because Study 3 of Hampton et al. (2007) suggested that category membership was not 
dependent upon the cause of the change (i.e. maturation vs. mutation, I believe subjects 
will be equally likely to essentialize animal and racial categories despite the cause of the 
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change. Finally, since race has been determined to be a natural kind and is believed to be 
an unchangeable trait (Haslam et al., 2000; Keller, 2005), I hypothesize that subjects will 
be more likely to essentialize racial categories more than animal categories. 
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II. 
Study 1 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-seven undergraduate students (19 male, 18 female; 30 Caucasian, 5 
African-American, 1 Hispanic, 1 biracial) from Western Kentucky University 
participated in the study for extra credit or course credit. Participants were obtained 
through the university’s psychology study board. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants. 
 
Stimuli  
  Following the stimuli from the Hampton et al. (2007) study, all scenarios depicted 
either an artifact, an animal, or a person that came to look and act like another artifact, 
animal, or person. All scenarios had the same format: (1) a brief description of the 
artifact, animal, or person, including references to it looking and acting like an I (initial); 
(2) a change in the artifact, animal, or person due to either maturation, mutation, or 
superficial alteration; (3) a brief description of the changed artifact, animal, or human, 
including reference to its looking and acting like an F (final).   
Three of the four animal scenarios printed in the appendix of the Hampton et al. 
(2007) article were used. These stories described the transformation of an animal that 
came to look like another animal. Seven new scenarios about objects and humans were 
also constructed. Two object stories were created and described how artifacts were 
changed to look and serve the purpose of another artifact. Two of the human 
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transformation stories described changes made to the body (hair length and body type 
changes) that changed the appearance of a person. These stories were used as filler items. 
Although they followed the same format as the other stories, they were based on 
superficial changes about an object or person and were described as being caused by 
human alterations (e.g. adding a handle, creating holes, receiving a haircut, losing weight, 
etc.). Three scenarios explaining racial transformations (black to white, white to Asian, 
etc.) were also used. These stories explained how a child of one race came to look and act 
like a child of another race (see Appendix pp. 58-59).  
Like the Hampton et al. (2007) transformation stories, animal and racial changes 
were based on the mutation or maturation of the animal or person. Maturation stories 
described the change as a result of natural processes that caused changes in the 
animal/human’s biological processes. In contrast, mutation stories described the change 
as a result of contamination in the environment that caused changed in the 
animal/human’s biological processes. Scenarios also included or excluded information 
about the exemplar’s offspring. Stories that included offspring information added a 
statement in which an animal or human’s offspring physically and behaviorally 
resembled the animal or human’s initial state, I.  Scenarios that excluded offspring 
information removed the statement about the physical and behavioral attributes of the 
animal or human’s offspring (see Appendix pp. 58-59). 
 
Design and procedure 
All scenarios were reversed (e.g. snake to lizard and lizard to snake). This 
scenario reversal was referred to as story direction. Story direction was counterbalanced 
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between-subjects. Thus, each participant received only one story direction for each 
object, animal, or human category (see Appendix p. 57). Hampton et al. (2007) suggested 
a difference in theoretical beliefs (causal homeostasis versus essentialism) may be the 
reason why subjects are more or less likely to essentialize based on the type of change. 
The condition (i.e. maturation or mutation) was also counter-balanced across participants. 
Approximately one-half of the participants received stories describing the change as a 
result of maturation while approximately one-half of the participants received stories 
describing the change a result of mutation. Approximately one-half of the participants 
received scenarios that included a statement in which an animal or human’s offspring 
physically and behaviorally resembled the animal or human’s initial state, I.  
Approximately one-half of the participants received scenarios that excluded all 
information about the physical and behavioral attributes of the animal or human’s 
offspring.  
Each scenario was followed by three rating scales. Questions followed the same 
typicality, categorization, and confidence rating format used in Experiment 3 of the 
Hampton et al. (2007) study. Because Hampton et al. (2007) found no statistical 
difference between the participants’ typicality and similarity responses, only typicality 
ratings were gathered for the purposes of the present experiment. Typicality questions 
followed the format “[Before/After] it changed, was the object/animal/human more 
typical of the initial category or final category? (e.g. Before/After it changed, was the 
animal more typical of a horse or a zebra?) For each scenario, typicality was asked about 
the object, animal, or human in both the before and after states. Scales of typicality 
ranged from 1 - initial category to 7 - final category. Category judgments followed the 
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format “After it changed, is the object/animal/human an x or y?” The category judgment 
responses were binary, with one choice indicating the initial category and the other 
indicating the final category. Participants also rated their confidence of the judgment 
category, on a scale of 1 - completely unsure to 5 - completely sure. In addition to the 
rating scales, participants were asked the following open-ended question: “Why do you 
believe this object/animal/person is an x or a y? Please provide a full justification for how 
you arrived at this decision.” This question was used to gather information about how the 
subject came to their decision. Participants were asked to provide written justifications 
for their response about the object, animal, or human’s final category. These justifications 
serve as a means to understand how each participant arrived at their final decision about 
the object/animal/human’s category membership. Following completion of the survey, 
the experimenter debriefed the participants (see Appendix p. 56). 
 
Results 
Stories that described changes to artifacts and bodily changes were treated as 
“filler” scenarios used to keep participant interest. The results of these scenarios were not 
analyzed. The majority of subjects (82%) stated that any changes that occurred to objects 
or bodily changes (e.g. weight loss/gain and increased/decreased hair length) changed the 
typicality and category membership of the object or individual.  
 
Typicality ratings 
Typicality ratings (lower scores indicate that the entity was more similar to the 
initial category and higher scores indicate the final category) were averaged across stories 
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within a category (animal or race). Average typicality ratings were submitted to a 2 
(category: animal vs. race) x 2 (condition: mutation vs. maturation) x 2 (offspring: 
included vs. excluded) x 2 (question: before change vs. after change) Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) with condition and offspring as between-subjects factors and 
category and question as within-subjects factors. The analysis resulted in a main effect of 
question F(1, 33) = 521.52, p = <.01. Subjects gave the before change question lower 
ratings (M = 1.28) than the after change question (M = 6.25). Before the change, the 
subjects rated the animal/person as more typical of the initial category whereas after the 
change, the subject rated the animal/person as more typical of the final category.  
The ANOVA also revealed a Category x Condition interaction F(1, 33) = 4.39, p 
= <.05. Post-hoc single df contrasts approached significance for the race category F(1, 
33) = 3.23, p = .08. When presented with race change stories, subjects in the mutation 
condition had a tendency to say that the person is more typical of the final category (M = 
3.91) than in the maturation condition (M = 3.52). However, there was no condition 
effect in the animal category, F(1, 33) = .016, p = .89 (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1.  Category x Condition Interaction   
 
*Error bars are used to indicate the statistical probability of errors (standard error).  
 
Sum change scores 
For each story, a score of zero was assigned if the subject said the exemplar did 
not change category membership and a score of 1 if the exemplar did change category 
membership. Scores were summed across the stories within each category (animal vs. 
race) and could range from 0 (none changed) to 3 (all changed). Change scores were 
submitted to a 2 (category: animal vs. race) x 2 (condition: mutation vs. maturation) x 2 
(offspring information: included vs. excluded) x 2 (question: before change vs. after 
change) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with condition and offspring as between-
subjects factors and category and question as within-subjects factors. The analysis 
resulted in a marginally significant main effect of offspring F(1, 33) = 3.98, p = .05. In 
the excluded condition in which the subjects were not given information about the 
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exemplar’s offspring, subjects gave higher scores (M = 2.13) than subjects in the 
included condition who received information that the physical and behavioral attributes 
of the exemplar’s offspring were consistent with the initial category (M = 1.36). Analysis 
also revealed a main effect of category F(1, 33) = 6.73, p = .01. Subjects had higher 
scores in the animal category (M = 1.97) than in the race category (M = 1.54) indicating 
they were less likely to say people changed their race than an animal could change its 
species.  
The ANOVA also revealed a Category x Condition interaction F(1, 33) = 5.29, p 
= .03. Post-hoc single df contrasts showed a significant effect of condition at the animal 
level F(1, 33) = 7.20, p = .01. Subjects gave higher scores in the maturation condition (M 
= 2.5) than in the mutation condition (M = 1.47) indicating they believed the animal was 
more likely to change through natural processes rather than unnatural processes (i.e. 
mutation). However, there was no effect of condition at the race level F(1, 33) = .330, p 
= .57 (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.  Category x Condition Interaction   
 
*Error bars are used to indicate the statistical probability of errors (standard error).  
 
Subjects consistently gave all of the stories either all zeros or all threes for both 
animal and race. In the reduced condition for animals, 11% of participants had change 
scores of zero and 63% had change scores of three. In the standard condition for animals, 
44% of participants had change scores of zero and 50% had change scores of three. For 
race stories, in the reduced condition 26% of subjects had scores of zero and 53% had 
scores of three. For the standard condition, 56% of subjects had change scores of zero 
and 33% had scores of three. Overall, 84% of subjects were completely consistent with 
their scores. This suggests that people are not responding randomly, but in consistent 
ways. 
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Confidence ratings 
Confidence ratings (which measured the subject’s confidence of their response on 
a scale of 1 - completely unsure to 5 - completely sure) were averaged within the animal 
and race categories. Confidence ratings were submitted to a 2 (category; animal vs. race) 
x 2 (condition; mutation vs. maturation) x 2 (offspring; included vs. excluded) x 2 
(question: before change vs. after change) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The analysis 
revealed no main effects or interactions (all p-values were greater than .05). The overall 
confidence rating was M = 3.94 suggesting that most participants tended to be more sure 
than unsure of their response.  
 
Justifications 
Hampton et al. (2007) coded their participant’s justifications into three different 
categories: surface features (what the exemplar looked and acted like; appearance and 
behavior), deep (the offspring were of a particular appearance) and cause (the nature of 
the change). In this study, participants provided a wide array of answers with various 
components. Therefore, new categories were made to address and understand the various 
justifications provided in the current study. Justifications were coded into one or more of 
the following categories: appearance (what the animal/person looked like), behavior 
(how the animal/person acted), offspring (subject made general reference to offspring or 
what offspring looked/acted like), biology/genetics (subject made reference to DNA, 
biological process, or “born that way”), change (subject made reference to the change or 
process the animal/person underwent), initial (subject made reference to the animal in the 
initial state, what it started out as), final (subject made reference to the animal in the final 
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state, what it ended up as), country of origin/culture (subject made reference of the 
person’s nationality, ethnicity, where they were from, or the culture they were exposed 
to), and supernatural power (subject made reference to a supernatural power (e.g. God) 
making them a particular way) (see Appendix pp. 64-65). After justifications were coded, 
the participants were divided into groups based on whether they had stated that the 
animal/person had (final category) or had not changed (initial category). These groupings 
provided information as to why the subject either essentialized or did not essentialize 
animals or race. 
In order to analyze subject’s justifications within each justification category, a z-
test for significance between two proportions was used. Statistical analysis revealed that 
participants who did not essentialize race were more likely to use appearance (z = 3.52, p 
= <.01) and behavior (z = 2.16, p = <.05) in their justifications. In contrast, participants 
who essentialized race, were more likely to use biology/genetics as their justification than 
those who did not (z = 4.70, p = <.01). For the offspring category, there was not a 
significant difference between those who did (11%) and did not essentialize race (5%) (z 
= 1.37, p = .17). Statistical analysis also revealed that participants who did not 
essentialize animals were more likely (47%) to use appearance in their justifications than 
those who did (21%) (z = 3.17, p = <.01). Unlike race, behavior was not significant for 
those who did not essentialize animals (18%) and those who did (9%) (z = 1.43, p = .15). 
Furthermore, the participants who essentialized animals, were more likely (19%) to use 
biology/genetics as their justification than those who did not (7%) (z = 1.43, p = <.05). 
For offspring, there were not enough observations in the non-essentialized group to 
calculate a z-score (see Figure 3 and Figure 4).  
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Figure 3. Animal Justifications 
 
 
Figure 4. Race Justifications 
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Summary of Results and Discussion 
Consistent with the typicality results reported in Study 1 of the Hampton et al. 
(2007) article, subjects rated the animal or person more typical of their initial category 
before the change and more typical of the final category after the change. Unlike the 
Study 1 and Study 2 results from Hampton et al. (2007), a category by condition 
interaction revealed that subjects rated a person more typical of the final category in the 
mutation condition. This interaction was only found for race. These results indicate that 
subjects believed a person was more typical of the final category if mutation was the 
cause of the change.  
Results from the change score analysis also confirmed several of my hypotheses 
about the essentialism of animals and race. A main effect of category revealed that people 
were more likely to say that an animal could change their species than a person could 
change their race. Furthermore, a main effect of offspring in the sum change analysis 
revealed that people were more likely to essentialize race in the included condition (i.e. 
offspring information is provided). Inconsistent with my hypothesis that subjects are 
equally likely to essentialize animal and race categories despite the cause of the change, 
an interaction between category and condition indicated that subjects were more likely to 
say the animal had changed as a result of maturation than as a result of mutation. 
However, this condition effect was not significant for race. This suggests that participants 
were more likely to indicate that a change in an animal (and not race) was due to 
biological changes within the animal. This finding may suggest that any prior knowledge 
the participants held (i.e. knowledge about animal’s physical adaptation to their 
environment or evolution) may have made the maturation condition more realistic.  
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Furthermore, justification data indicated that participants who were more likely to 
essentialize animal categories relied on the animal’s biology/genetics as the reason for 
why the animal did not change. For those participants who did not essentialize animals, 
they relied heavily on the animal’s appearance. Similarly, participants who essentialized 
race also relied on biology/genetics to explain why the person’s race had not changed. In 
contrast to animals, those who did not essentialize race stated appearance and behavior as 
their reasons for believing the person had changed. The fact that subjects who did not 
essentialize animals only used appearance, suggests that behavior is seen as a defining 
feature that separates humans and animals.  
Overall, the results of Study 1 suggested that participants may not have 
distinguished between the maturation and mutation conditions since condition was not 
significant for race stories. This suggests the “natural transformation” was no more 
natural than the toxic transformation. Therefore, I decided to create new scenarios that 
provided a clearer distinction between these two processes. In the new scenarios, the 
changes were based upon an intended (changes that were naturally occurring in animals 
or a change based on a choice made by a person) versus unintended (changes in animals 
as a result of an unnatural occurrence or a side effect of medication in a person) change. 
Such changes help us to more clearly understand why participants are willing to 
essentialize animals and race. When presented with race change stories, subjects in the 
mutation condition had a tendency to say that the person is more typical of the final 
category (M = 3.91) than in the maturation condition (M = 3.52). However, there was no 
condition effect in the animal category, F(1, 33) = .016, p = .89. 
This finding supports the theory of causal homeostasis. In the maturation 
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condition, the person may have been viewed as possessing an “essence” that would lead 
to the “predestined” changes as they matured. However, in the mutation condition, 
subjects may have viewed the mutation scenario as having actually changed the deep 
properties within the person. In addition, offspring proved to be a key factor in many of 
the participants’ choices. The excluded offspring condition was significant at the category 
level. This suggests that participants were more likely to say an animal or race had 
changed when a description about the offspring’s appearance and behavior was excluded. 
This suggests that genetic information (what kind of offspring does the person produce) 
is important to participants. At the same time, some of the participants cited social or 
cultural bases for race.  If race is primarily social or cultural, then genetic information 
should be less important. In order to more directly test this idea, in Study 2, a new 
condition was created to determine the effect of a change in the germ line. In these 
instances, offspring information was provided for all animal and race stories. These new 
scenarios included a statement that the animal or human’s offspring resembled the initial 
state, I or that the animal or human’s offspring resembled the final state, F; thus creating 
an initial condition (the offspring resembled the initial state, I) and final (the offspring 
resembled the final state, F) condition. 
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          III. 
Study 2 
Methods 
Participants 
Ninety-six undergraduate students (67 female, 29 male; 80 Caucasian, 8 African-
American, 2 Asian, 2 Hispanic, 1 Native American, 1West Indian, 2 biracial) from 
Western Kentucky University participated in the study for extra credit or course credit. 
Participants were obtained through the university’s psychology study board and each 
participant was provided informed consent. 
 
Stimuli 
  Study 2 was the same as Study 1 except that one-half of the scenarios included a 
statement that the animal or human’s offspring resembled the initial state, I. One-half of 
the scenarios included a statement that the animal or human’s offspring resembled the 
final state, F.  Because Study 1 revealed that condition (e.g. maturation and mutation) 
was not significant and did not affect how people responded to race stories, three new 
scenarios explaining racial transformations (black to white, white to Asian, etc.) were 
created. These new stories explained how a child of one race came to look and act like an 
adult of another race. Conditions were no longer a result of mutation and maturation. 
Instead, the new racial transformation stories described race changes as a result of 
unintended (e.g. change as a result of an unexpected side effect of medication) or 
intended (e.g. change brought about by one’s decision to take medication to alter one’s 
appearance) change. Changes were also made to the transformation stories about animals. 
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Much like the race stories, the scenarios described animal changes as a result of an 
intended (e.g. change as a result of a naturally occurring process) or unintended (e.g. 
change brought about by contamination from the environment) change (see Appendix pp. 
60-61).  
 
Design and procedure.  
Each scenario was followed by two rating scales. Questions followed the same 
typicality and categorization rating format used in Study 1. Because confidence ratings 
failed to reveal main effects in Study 1; therefore they were removed from Study 2. In 
addition to the rating scales, participants were asked the following open-ended question: 
“Why do you believe this object/animal/person is an x or a y? What information was most 
important in arriving at this decision? Please provide a full justification for how you 
arrived at this decision.” The phrase “What information was most important in arriving at 
this decision?” was added due to the fact that many of the participants’ justifications in 
Study 1 were unclear in their reasoning for the responses. Thus, the new phrase was 
added to the justification question in order to probe participants for more fine-tuned 
answers (see p. 63). 
Procedures for Study 2 remained the same as Study 1.  
 
      Results 
Stories that described changes to artifacts and bodily changes were treated as 
“filler” scenarios used to keep participant interest. The results of these scenarios were not 
analyzed. Furthermore, the majority (89%) of subjects stated that any changes that 
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occurred to objects or bodily changes (e.g. weight loss/gain and increased/decreased hair 
length) changed the typicality and category membership of the object or individual. 
 
Typicality ratings 
Typicality ratings (lower scores indicate that the entity was more similar to the 
initial category and higher scores indicate the final category) were averaged across stories 
within a category (animal or race). Typicality ratings were submitted to a 2 (category: 
animal vs. race) x 2 (condition: intended vs. unintended) x 2 (offspring: initial vs. final) x 
2 (question: before change vs. after change) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with 
condition and offspring as between-subjects factors and category and question as within-
subjects factors. The analysis resulted in a main effect of offspring F(1, 92) = 8.93, p = 
<.01.  Subjects gave lower ratings when the offspring were identified as the initial 
category (M = 3.37) than when the offspring were identified as the final category (M = 
3.73). Therefore, the subjects saw the animal/person as more typical of the initial 
category if the offspring were also identified as the initial category and more typical of 
the final category if the offspring were identified as the final category. The analysis also 
indicated a main effect of question F(1, 92) = 955.09, p = <.01. Subjects gave the before 
change question lower ratings (M = 1.20) than the after change question (M = 5.89). 
Before the change, the subjects saw the animal/person as more typical of the initial 
category whereas after the change, the subject saw the animal/person as more typical of 
the final category. The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of category F(1, 92) = 17.13, 
p = <.01. Subjects gave higher ratings to animal categories (M = 3.73) than to race 
categories (M = 3.37) indicating that animals were viewed as being more typical of the 
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final category than were race categories.  
The analysis also produced a Category x Question interaction F(1, 92) = 7.20, p = 
<.01. A post-hoc t-test revealed a difference between ratings of animal and race when 
measured by the before question (t(95) = 2.33, p = <.05) and a difference between 
animal and race ratings when measured by the after question (t(95) = 3.79, p = <.01). 
These results suggest that subjects believed that both animals and race were more typical 
of the final category after the change and that a change had occurred. Also, before and 
after questions showed a change in typicality for animals (t(95) = 32.63, p = <.01) and 
race (t(95) = 23.57, p = <.01). These results indicate that subjects believed animals were 
more typical of the final category than race was typical of the final category. However, 
this interaction is so small it is not psychologically meaningful (see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5.  Category x Question Interaction 
 
*Error bars are used to indicate the statistical probability of errors (standard error).  
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Sum change scores 
For each story, a score of zero was assigned if the subject said the exemplar did 
not change and a score of 1 if the exemplar did change. Scores were summed across the 
stories within each category (animal vs. race) and could range from 0 (none changed) to 3 
(all changed). Change scores were submitted to a 2 (category: animal vs. race) x 2 
(condition: intended vs. unintended) x 2 (offspring: initial vs. final) Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) with condition and offspring as between-subjects factors and category and 
question as within-subjects factors. The analysis resulted in a significant main effect of 
offspring F(1, 92) = 31.33, p = <.01. Subjects were more likely to indicate the exemplar 
had changed (M = 1.80) when the exemplar’s offspring resembled the changed (i.e. final) 
state than when the offspring resembled the unchanged (i.e. initial) state (M = .80).  
There was also a marginally significant main effect of condition F(1, 92) = 3.48, p = .07. 
Subjects gave higher scores when they were presented with the intended condition (M = 
1.47) than when given the unintended condition (M = 1.14). This indicates that subjects 
were more likely to accept the exemplar had changed as a result of an intended change 
(natural processes) rather than an unintended change (contamination). Therefore, subjects 
were more likely to say an animal or race had changed when the change was intended.  
The ANOVA revealed a Category x Condition interaction F(1, 92) = 10.17, p = 
<.01. Single df contrasts showed that in both the intended condition F(1, 47) = 49.69, p 
= <.01 and unintended condition F(1, 47) = 12.58, p = <.01, subjects rated animals as 
more likely to change than race. However, the magnitude of the difference was greater 
for the intended condition than the unintended condition.  
A t-test (t(94) = 3.11, p = <.01) also revealed a difference between intended 
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versus unintended conditions for animals. This suggests that subjects were more likely to 
indicate a change in the animal if the change had been the result of an intended change 
rather than an unintended change. However, a t-test (t(94) = .03, p = .74) did not reveal 
the same trend for race. Therefore, subjects were not any more likely to say race had 
changed if presented the intended or unintended condition (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Category x Condition Interaction 
 
*Error bars are used to indicate the statistical probability of errors (standard error).  
 
 The analysis also revealed a Category x Offspring interaction F(1, 92) = 4.98, p 
= <.05. A t-test revealed a significant effect of offspring for animals and race. For 
animals, in both the initial (t(94) = 3.87, p = <.01) and final (t(94) = 5.87, p = <.01) 
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conditions, subjects were more likely to say that category had changed than race. This 
suggests that subjects were more likely to say category had changed for animals when the 
offspring were described as having characteristics of either the initial or final state than 
race. 
A t-test also revealed a main effect of category for offspring. For both animals 
(t(94) = 5.99, p = <.01) and race (t(94) = 2.99, p = <.01), participants were more likely 
to say the animal or race changed when offspring were described as having 
characteristics of the final state than the initial state (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7. Category x Offspring Interaction 
 
*Error bars are used to indicate the statistical probability of errors (standard error).  
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Moreover, as in Study 1, subjects consistently gave all of the stories either all 
zeros or all threes for both animal and race. In the offspring as final category condition 
for animals, 4% of participants had average change scores of zero and 69% of subjects 
had average change scores of three. In the offspring as initial category, 40% of 
participants had average change scores of zero and 21% had average change scores of 
three. For race stories, in the offspring as final category condition 52% of subjects had 
average change scores of zero and 31% of participants had average change scores of 
three. For the offspring as initial category condition, 73% of subjects had average change 
scores of zero and 8% had average change scores of three. Overall, 93% of subjects were 
completely consistent with their scores for all animal stories and all race stories. Like the 
results of Study 1, this suggests that people were not responding randomly, but in 
consistent ways.  
 
Justifications 
In accordance with Study 1, justifications were coded into one or more of the 
following categories: appearance (what the animal/person looked like), behavior (how 
the animal/person acted), offspring (subject made general reference to offspring or what 
offspring looked/acted like), biology/genetics (subject made reference to DNA, biological 
process, or “born that way”), change (subject made reference to the change or process the 
animal/person underwent), initial (subject made reference to the animal in the initial 
state, what it started out as), final (subject made reference to the animal on the final state, 
what it ended up as), country of origin/culture (subject made reference of the person’s 
nationality, ethnicity, where they were from, or the culture they were exposed to), and 
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supernatural power (subject made reference to a supernatural power (e.g. God) making 
them a particular way) (see Appendix pp. 64-65). After justifications were coded, the 
participants were divided into groups based on whether they had stated that the 
animal/person had (final category) or had not changed (initial category). These groupings 
provided information as to why the subject either essentialized or did not essentialize 
animals or race.  
Like Study 1, a z-test for significance between two proportions was used. 
Statistical analysis revealed that participants who did not essentialize race were more 
likely to use appearance (z = 4.66, p = <.01), behavior (z = 3.32, p = <.01) and type of 
change (z = 3.28, p = <.01) in their justifications. In contrast, participants who 
essentialized race, were likely to use biology/genetics as their justification than those who 
did not (z = 5.47, p = <.01). For the offspring category, there was not a significant 
difference between those who did (19%) and did not essentialize race (14%) (z = 1.13, p 
= .26). Similar to the race category, statistical analysis revealed that participants who did 
not essentialize animals were more likely to use appearance (z = 2.92, p = <.01) and 
change (z = 5.28, p = <.01). For participants who used behavior in their justifications, 
there was a marginally significant difference between those who did not essentialize 
animals (13%) and those who did essentialize animals (8%) (z = 1.93, p = .054).  
Furthermore, the participants who essentialized animals, were more likely to use 
biology/genetics (z = 5.06, p = <.01) and offspring (z = 5.48, p = <.01) as their 
justification (see Figure 8 and Figure 9).  
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Figure 8.   Animal Justifications 
 
 
Figure 9. Race Justifications 
 
 
	  	  
42 	  
Summary of Results and Discussion 
Consistent with the typicality results reported in Study 1 of the Hampton et al. 
(2007) article and Study 1 of the current research, a main effect of question revealed that 
subjects rated the animal or person more typical of their initial category before the change 
and more typical of the final category after the change. However, typicality results from 
the current study revealed a main effect of category. This main effect of category 
revealed that subjects gave higher ratings to animal categories; indicating that 
participants viewed animals as being more typical of the final category than race. Unlike 
Study 1 of the current research project, typicality rating analysis revealed a main effect of 
offspring which suggests that subjects perceived the animal or person as more typical of 
the initial category when offspring were described as being in the initial stage. Coinciding 
with the main effect of category found in Study 1 and Study 2 of the current research, a 
category by question interaction revealed that subjects rated an animal and person more 
typical of the final category after the change.  
Results from the change score analysis greatly differed from the change score 
results found in Study 1. Although I hypothesized that subjects would be equally likely to 
essentialize animal and race categories despite the cause of the change, an interaction 
between category and condition revealed that people were more likely to say that an 
animal had changed as a result of an intended change (i.e. natural process) than the result 
of an unintended change (i.e. contamination). However, this trend was not found for race; 
indicating that participants were no more likely to say race has changed in either the 
intended or unintended condition. Furthermore, a main effect of offspring revealed that 
people were more likely to suggest that the animal or person had changed when provided 
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with information stating the offspring resembled the animal/person in the final state. A 
category by offspring interaction also revealed that subjects were more likely to say an 
animal or race had changed when their offspring were described as being in the final 
state. However, for animals only, subjects were more likely to indicate that the animal 
had changed regardless of the offspring’s state (either initial or final).   
Furthermore, justification data indicated that participants who essentialized 
animal categories relied on the animal’s biology/genetics and offspring information as the 
reason for why the animal did not change. Participants, who did not essentialize animals, 
relied heavily on the animal’s appearance, behavior, and change. In contrast to animals, 
participants who essentialized race only relied on biology/genetics to explain why the 
person’s race had not changed. Similarly, those who did not essentialize race stated 
appearance, behavior, and change as their reasons for believing the animal had changed.  
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IV. 
General Discussion 
 The main goal of the current study was to determine if people essentialize race 
and if so, to what extent. The study modeled the Hampton et al. (2007) research which 
focused on people’s tendency to essentialize animals. By comparing the current study to 
the results of Hampton et al. (2007) research, I hoped to determine how the essentialism 
of animals differed from the essentialism of human categories such as race. Overall, the 
results found within the current study confirmed several of my hypotheses while also 
yielding some surprising and interesting results. 
The first goal was to determine if the results of the current study were similar to 
the findings of Hampton et al. (2007). Consistent with the typicality results reported in 
Study 1 of the Hampton et al. (2007) article, the current research revealed that subjects 
rated the animal more typical of the initial category before the change and more typical of 
the final category after the change. This suggests that participants were willing to accept 
that physical changes did occur. Furthermore, this implies that people are willing to 
believe that animals can go through a physical transformation that greatly alters the 
animal’s original appearance.  
Consistent with Hampton et al.’s (2007) results in Study 3, when offspring 
information (information that described the offspring as having the same appearance and 
behavior as the animal or person before the change) was omitted in Study 1, participants 
were more likely to suggest that the animal had changed. These results are believed to 
have occurred because offspring provides further information about the animal’s biology, 
genetics, and ultimately their “essence”. If such information is omitted, participants have 
	  	  
45 	  
to rely on information about the animal’s appearance and behavior after the change. 
Furthermore, when offspring information is unknown to the subject, the change can be 
viewed as having actually changed the internal properties of the animal. Thus, the cause 
of change becomes the main focus instead of information (i.e. offspring characteristics) 
that may negate how “deep” the change occurred.  
In contrast to Hampton et al. (2007) findings in Study 3 that people were likely to 
say the animal had changed regardless of the cause of transformation, Study 1 of the 
current research revealed that subjects were more likely to say the animal had changed as 
a result of maturation. This finding may suggest that participants found the maturation 
more believable than the mutation condition. Furthermore, any prior knowledge the 
participants may have held, such as knowledge about animal’s physical adaptation to 
their environment as well as evolution, may have made the maturation condition more 
realistic; thus making it more plausible to rate that the animal had changed.   
Hampton et al. (2007) found that participants were more sure of their category 
judgments of animals before the change occurred. In addition, participants were less sure 
of their category judgments after the change in conditions where information about the 
animal’s offspring was provided versus scenarios that excluded information about the 
animal’s offspring.  Contrary to these results, Study 1 of the current study revealed no 
main effects or interactions. Furthermore, the overall confidence rating was M=3.94 
suggesting that most participants tended to be more sure than unsure of their response. 
Ultimately, I am unsure as to why differences in confidence ratings occurred between the 
current study and the study conducted by Hampton et al. (2007). 
 Finally, justifications between the current study and the Hampton et al. (2007) 
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research were also similar. Justification results of Study 2 are consistent with the Study 1 
results Hampton et al. research in that people who failed to essentialize animals relied 
heavily on appearance as their justification for why the animal had changed. However, in 
Study 1 of the current research, people who failed to essentialize animals relied only on 
appearance as their justification; behavior was not found to be significant. Furthermore, 
people who failed to essentialize animals in Study 2, also used change (the fact that some 
transformation had occurred) as part of their justification for why the animal had 
changed. Consistent with the results of Study 1 in the Hampton et al. (2007) article, 
subjects who essentialized in Study 2, but not Study 1, used information about offspring 
as justification for why the animal had not changed. Furthermore, unlike the results of the 
Hampton et al. research, those who essentialized animals in Study 1 and Study 2 also 
used biology/genetics as their justification for why the animal had not changed. 
 
Do people essentialize race? 
 The second goal of the study was to determine if subjects have a tendency to 
essentialize race. Typicality results of Study 1 reveal that before the change, participants 
rated the person as more typical of the initial category and more typical of the final 
category after the change. Furthermore, for typicality ratings, people rated race as more 
typical of the final category in the mutation condition. These results suggest that 
participants may have viewed changes in race as more plausible in the mutation condition 
than in the maturation condition. Change scores from Study 1 also revealed that people 
were less likely to indicate a change in race than a change in animals. Furthermore, the 
condition was not significant for race; indicating that the type of change (either mutation 
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or maturation) that occurred made participants no more likely to accept this change. 
Ultimately, these results suggest that participants were more likely to essentialize race 
than animals.  
 Study 2 revealed similar results for typicality ratings. Again, subjects rated a 
person more typical of the initial category before the change and more typical of the final 
category after the change. This indicates that participants were willing to accept that 
physical changes did occur to the person to make them more typical of the new race. 
Furthermore, a category by question interaction reveals that animals were viewed as more 
typical of the final category after the change than race. This is an important finding 
because it implies that people are more willing to believe that animals, not people, can go 
through a physical transformation to alter their appearance. For change score data, 
subjects were less likely to say that race had changed in both intended and unintended 
conditions when compared to animals. Again, these results indicate a tendency for 
participants to essentialize race more often than animals.   	  
	  
How do people essentialize race? 
One of the most important goals of this study was to determine how and to what 
extent people essentialize race. Results from Study 1 indicated that when information 
about offspring was provided, people were less likely to indicate that race had changed. 
Change score results from Study 2 also suggest that people were less likely to say race 
had changed (when compared to animals) in either the intended or unintended condition. 
Furthermore, justification data was collected and analyzed to determine what information 
people used to reach their final decision. Those subjects who essentialized race indicated 
biology/genetics (in Study 1 and Study 2) as the reason for why they believed the person 
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had not changed. In comparison, people who essentialized animals used biology/genetics 
(in Study 1 and 2) as well as offspring (in Study 2). Although similar information was 
used as justification for why animals and race had not changed, people were still less 
willing to accept that a change occurred in race. This may suggest that people believe 
there is a larger genetic/biological component to race than animals. Furthermore, people 
may be more willing to accept changes in animals due to the fact that the scenarios (i.e. 
maturation and mutation vs. natural process and toxic contamination from the 
environment) may be more believable for animals than humans. This may be the case 
given that environmental adaptation and evolution are more widely accepted for animal 
categories than for humans.  However, a change in race may be viewed as more as being 
static given societal and biological components and perceptions of race. 
As mentioned in the introduction, when we study how individuals define the 
characteristics or the “essences” that are believed to “cause” race; we gain knowledge 
about how people create racial categories and how those groupings shape our racial 
judgments. Justification data provided in Study 1 and Study 2, confirms participants’ 
belief that race is an “essence” or an unseen and underlying property with complex 
biological and genetic components. While subjects who failed to essentialize race relied 
on information about the person’s appearance or behavior; subjects who essentialized 
race used biology/genetics as the reason for why race cannot be changed. This suggests 
that the majority of participants believe race to be more complex than one’s appearance 
and behavior. In addition, they point to biology and genetics as the “essence” that 
differentiates racial categories. Moreover, this study has confirmed people’s resistance to 
state that race is a changeable feature. Although they are more likely to state that a person 
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can take on the characteristics of a new race, they are still reluctant to believe the 
person’s “essence” has indeed changed.  
Overall, this study has added to the field of psychology by providing even more 
insight about the ways people understand and categorize social categories such as race. 
This study provides further support for the belief that race as a natural kind given that 
subjects were more likely to essentialize race than animals. The study also suggests that 
people view race differently than other factors related to appearance (i.e. hair length and 
weight). In both studies, the majority of subjects were willing to state that a person 
changed if their hair or weight changed; however, they were unwilling to indicate a 
person could change their race. Furthermore, the justification data obtained in the study 
was one of the first studies to differentiate the reasoning used by those who did and did 
not essentialize animals and race. Aside from these contributions, this study also reveals 
important information about the participants. Participants in Study 1 and Study 2 were 
able to distinguish typicality from category membership. Although they were likely to 
suggest the animal or person was typical of the final category after a change occurred, 
they were unwilling to indicate that the animal or person had actually changed category 
membership after such change occurred. These judgments are quite mature and suggest 
that participants had the ability to disassociate between the exemplars’ appearance and 
the “essence” that defined the animal or person. Despite these mature judgments, 
participants’ tendency to essentialize race and associate race with biological components 
(e.g. genetics) may have negative social implications. As Keller (2005) concluded, a 
belief in biological components of essentialism is associated with negative racial 
stereotyping, sexism, and prejudice. Therefore, participants who were more likely to 
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respond in an essentialist fashion may hold more sexist, prejudice, and stereotypical ideas 
of racial groups than those who failed to essentialize race.  
 Despite the interesting discoveries found in Study 1 and Study 2 of the current 
research, questions still remain. What part does one’s own race play in the essentialism of 
race? Why are people more likely to essentialize racial categories than animals? When 
presented with the same scenarios, do children essentialize race? If so, do children 
essentialize race in the same way as adults? Although hypotheses can be made, specific 
answers cannot be directly determined by the current study. While these questions are 
worth exploring in future research, we must look at the current research as a small step in 
understanding the complex realm of race.  
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INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
Project Title: Essences and Transformations in Objects, Animals, and Humans 
 
Investigator:  Brooke Smith, B.A. and Kelly Madole, Ph.D., Dept. of Psychology, 745-
6475 
 
You are being asked to participate in a project conducted through Western Kentucky 
University. The University requires that you give your signed agreement to participate in 
this project. 
 
The investigator will explain to you in detail the purpose of the project, the procedures to 
be used, and the potential benefits and possible risks of participation.  You may ask 
him/her any questions you have to help you understand the project.  A basic explanation 
of the project is written below.  Please read this explanation and discuss with the 
researcher any questions you may have. 
 
If you then decide to participate in the project, please sign on the last page of this form in 
the presence of the person who explained the project to you.  You should be given a copy 
of this form to keep. 
 
1. Nature and Purpose of the Project:  The goal of this study is to understand how 
adults think about important categories such as objects, animals, and people.   
 
2. Explanation of Procedures:  You will be asked to read 10 to 20 scenarios and then 
answer some brief questions about the identity of the object, animal, or person in the 
story.  In addition, you will be asked to supply your reasons for these answers. The entire 
procedure should take no more than 45 minutes. 
 
3. Discomfort and Risks: This study has no risks beyond those you would incur in 
everyday life. 
 
4. Benefits:  Your instructor may provide you with course credit or extra credit for 
participating.   
 
5. Confidentiality:  Your participation in this research is confidential.  Your name will 
not appear on any answer sheet.  In the event of publication of this research, only group 
data will be reported.  No personally identifying information will be disclosed.   
 
6. Refusal/Withdrawal:  Refusal to participate in this study will have no effect on any 
future services you may be entitled to from the University.  Anyone who agrees to 
participate in this study is free to withdraw from the study at any time with no penalty. 
 
You understand also that it is not possible to identify all potential risks in an 
experimental procedure, and you believe that reasonable safeguards have been taken to 
minimize both the known and potential but unknown risks. 
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__________________________________________ _______________ 
Signature of Participant      Date 
 
 
__________________________________________ _______________ 
Witness        Date 
 
THE DATED APPROVAL ON THIS CONSENT FORM INDICATES THAT 
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY 
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW BOARD 
Paul Mooney, Compliance Coordinator 
TELEPHONE:  (270) 745-4652 
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Debriefing Document 
 
Essences and Transformations in Objects, Animals, and Humans 
 
Why do we categorize things the way that we do? What makes a horse a horse and not a 
zebra? Is it just the way it looks, or is there something deeper (an “essence”) that 
determines its identity? Cognitive psychologists have suggested that even young children 
are capable of ignoring appearance and instead act as though there is an essence that 
determines the category membership of natural objects. We may not know what this 
essence is, but we act as though it exists. So, in many studies, participants will deny that 
an animal can change its species membership just by changing its appearance. However, 
people are somewhat more likely to say an animal can change if the change is the result 
of a natural developmental process. Although there has been a fair amount of research on 
how people categorize animals and artifacts categories, less is known about how we 
categorize people. We know that racial categories, for example, can have a big impact on 
society as well as individuals. However, we do not know that much about what people 
think race is. Is it just the way a person looks, or is there some deeper essence to racial 
categories? We are using the same kinds of stories that researchers have used to 
understand animal categories to try to understand how people think about the social 
categories that are so important in everyday life. We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
 
Brooke Smith (alicia.smith@wku.edu) 
Kelly Madole (kelly.madole@wku.edu) 
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Story Direction 
 Direction 1: 
 
White-Black 
Asian-Black 
Asian-White 
Curvy-Skinny 
Short-Long 
Snake-Lizard 
Bee-Hummingbird 
Horse-Zebra 
Pipe-Flute 
Flower Vase-Coffeemug 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direction 2: 
 
Black-White 
Black-Asian 
White-Asian 
Skinny-Curvy 
Long-Short 
Lizard-Snake 
Hummingbird-Bee 
Zebra-Horse 
Flute-Pipe 
Coffemug-Flower Vase 
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Story Samples 
Study 1-Mutation, Included 
Object: 
When this object was made, it was used to hold coffee and other drinks. The object had other 
features associated with coffee mugs and was used for the kinds of things coffee mugs are used 
for. One day, as a result of alterations made by people, the coffee mug was changed. The handle 
was removed, it was filled with water, and roses were placed in it. Finally, the object looked like 
and served the purposes of a flower vase. 
Body Change:  
A child was thin and had other physical features of skinny people. The child did the kinds of 
things skinny people do. Over time, the child gained weight. The child developed fat in different 
areas of their body and developed other physical features associated with curvy people.  
Animal:  
This black and white animal had stripes, four legs, an elongated head, and a tail-it looked and 
acted just like a zebra. But over time, as a result of toxic contamination in its environment, the 
animal began to change. Toxic contamination caused a restructuring of the biological processes 
in the animal’s body. It lost its stripes, turned brown, and it came to look and act just like a horse. 
When it mated, the offspring looked and acted just like zebras. 
Race: 
A white child had straight hair, light skin, and other physical features associated with white 
people. The child did the kind of things other white children do. One day, as a result of toxic 
contamination in its environment, the child began to change. Toxic contamination caused a 
restructuring of the biological processes in the child’s body. The child developed the physical 
features associated with Asian people and began to act like Asian children. When the child grew 
older, got married, and had children of their own, their children looked and acted just like white 
people. 
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Study 1-Maturation, Excluded 
Object: 
When this object was made, it was used in a fountain. Water flowed through it and sprayed out in 
a lovely pattern. The object had other features associated with pipes and was used for the kinds 
of things pipes are used for. One day, as a result of alterations made by people, the pipe was 
changed. A section was cut off, holes were placed in it, a mouthpiece was added so people could 
blow through it, and it was polished. After these changed had been made, wonderful music could 
be made with it. Finally, the object looked like and served the purposes of a flute. 
Body Change:  
 
A child had short hair and other physical features associated with short-haired people. The child 
did the kinds of things people with short hair do. One day, the child decided to let their hair grow 
longer. The child’s hair became so long that the child was able to put their hair in a ponytail.   
 
Animal:  
 
There was a small animal with transparent wings and a black and yellow striped body. It always 
went buzzing about. The animal looked and acted just like a bee. But then, as a result of natural 
developmental processes, the animal began to change. Natural developmental processes caused a 
restructuring of the biological processes in the animal’s body. Eventually, it ended up with wings 
and feathers and lived on the nectar of flowers. It looked and acted just like a hummingbird. 
 
Race:	   
 
An Asian child had dark, straight hair, light skin, and other physical features associated with 
Asian people. The child did the kind of things other Asian children do. One day, as a result of 
natural developmental processes, the child began to change. Natural developmental processes 
caused a restructuring of the biological processes in the child’s body. The child developed curly 
hair, dark skin, and other physical features associated with black people. The child began doing 
the kind of things black children do. 
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Study 2-Unitended, Final 
Object: 
When this object was made, it was used in a fountain. Water flowed through it and sprayed out in 
a lovely pattern. The object had other features associated with pipes and was used for the kinds 
of things pipes are used for. One day, as a result of alterations made by people, the pipe was 
changed. A section was cut off, holes were placed in it, a mouthpiece was added so people could 
blow through it, and it was polished. After these changed had been made, wonderful music could 
be made with it. Finally, the object looked like and served the purposes of a flute. 
Body Change:  
 
A child had short hair and other physical features associated with short-haired people. The child 
did the kinds of things people with short hair do. One day, the child decided to let their hair grow 
longer. The child’s hair became so long that the child was able to put their hair in a ponytail.   
 
Animal:  
 
There was a small animal with transparent wings and a black and yellow striped body. It always 
went buzzing about. The animal looked and acted just like a bee. But then, as a result of toxic 
contamination from chemicals in its environment, the animal began to change. The chemicals 
caused a restructuring of the biological processes in the animal’s body. Eventually, it ended up 
with wings and feathers and lived on the nectar of flowers. It looked and acted just like a 
hummingbird.  
Race:	   
An Asian child had dark, straight hair, light skin, and other physical features associated with 
Asian people. The child grew up in an Asian family and did the kinds of things families like 
them do. One day the child became sick with stomach problems. The child went to the doctor 
and the doctor prescribed medicine. As a result of side effects from the medication, they began to 
change. As the child grew older, the medication caused a restructuring of the biological 
processes in the person’s body. The person developed the physical features associated with white 
people and began to act like white people. When the person got married, and had children of 
their own, their children looked and acted just like white people. 
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Study 2-Intended, Initial 
Object: 
When this object was made, it was used in a fountain. Water flowed through it and sprayed out in 
a lovely pattern. The object had other features associated with pipes and was used for the kinds 
of things pipes are used for. One day, as a result of alterations made by people, the pipe was 
changed. A section was cut off, holes were placed in it, a mouthpiece was added so people could 
blow through it, and it was polished. After these changed had been made, wonderful music could 
be made with it. Finally, the object looked like and served the purposes of a flute. 
Body Change:  
 
A child had short hair and other physical features associated with short-haired people. The child 
did the kinds of things people with short hair do. One day, the child decided to let their hair grow 
longer. The child’s hair became so long that the child was able to put their hair in a ponytail.   
 
Animal:  
 
This brown animal had four legs, an elongated head, and a tail- it looked and acted just like a 
horse. But over time, as a result of natural development processes, the animal began to change. 
Natural developmental processes caused a restructuring of the biological processes in the 
animal’s body. It developed black and white stripes, and it came to look and act just like a zebra. 
When it mated, the offspring looked and acted just like horses.  
Race:	   
An Asian child had dark, straight hair, light skin and other physical features associated with 
Asian people. The child grew up in an Asian family and did the kind if things families like them 
do. However, when the child grew older, they wanted to be different. As a result of chemicals 
provided by a doctor, they began to change. The chemical caused a restructuring of the 
biological processes in the person’s body. The person developed the physical features associated 
with white people and began to act like white people. When the person got married, and had 
children of their own, their children looked and acted just like Asian people.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  
62 	  
Format of Survey 
Study 1 
 
This black and white animal had stripes, four legs, an elongated head, and a tail-it looked and 
acted just like a zebra. But over time, as a result of natural developmental processes, the animal 
began to change. Natural developmental processes caused a restructuring of the biological 
processes in the animal’s body. It lost its stripes, turned brown, and it came to look and act just 
like a horse. When it mated, the offspring looked and acted just like zebras.  
 
Instructions: Please circle your response. 
 
Before it changed, was the animal more typical of a zebra or a horse? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
        Zebra              Horse 
 
After it changed, was the animal more typical of a zebra or a horse? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
        Zebra              Horse 
 
After it changed, is the animal a zebra or a horse? 
 
Zebra  Horse 
 
How sure are you that this animal is either a zebra or a horse? 
   
1 2  3 4 5 
  Completely            Neutral         Completely  
     Unsure              Sure 
 
Why do you believe this animal is either a zebra or a horse? Please provide a full justification for 
how you arrived at this decision. 
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Format of Survey 
Study 2 
 
This brown animal had four legs, an elongated head, and a tail—it looked and acted just like a 
horse. One day, as a result of toxic contamination from chemicals in its environment, the animal 
began to change. The chemicals caused a restructuring of the biological processes in the animal’s 
body. It developed black and white stripes, and it came to look and act just like a zebra. When it 
mated, the offspring looked and acted like zebras. 
Instructions: Please circle your response. 
 
Before it changed, was the animal more typical of a zebra or a horse? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
        Zebra              Horse 
 
After it changed, was the animal more typical of a zebra or a horse? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
        Zebra              Horse 
 
After it changed, is the animal a zebra or a horse? 
 
Zebra  Horse 
 
 
Why do you believe this animal is either a zebra or a horse? What information was most 
important in arriving at this decision? Please provide a full justification for how you arrived at 
this decision. 
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Examples of Justifications 
Appearance 
“They story said that the animal looked and acted like a horse. The chemicals changed the 
animal’s appearance…” 
“It is still a horse its physically appearance just changed to look like a zebra.” 
Behavior 
“It grew feathers and it acted as a hummingbird.” 
“It no longer did the same things as a bee, so it wasn't a bee. It did all the things characteristic of 
hummingbirds and passed them down.” 
Biology/Genetics 
“The person appeared white but internally their DNA hadn't changed. They were still black. 
Albino people, for example, appear white but they are black if they were born in a black family 
with a black mother and father.” 
“The animal is still a zebra even after the contamination. Its offspring were zebra and its DNA is 
still that of a zebra.” 
Offspring 
“The person is still a white person because even after alterations their offspring are white. A 
person's physical features don't determine race, genetics do.” 
“The main information that proves this is a snake is what it produces. Since its offspring are 
snakes it must be a snake.” 
Change 
“I believe the animal is a bee due to the toxic contamination from chemicals in the environment.” 
“Their biology is very similar but the environmental changes altered specific DNA to cause 
changes.” 
Initial 
“She started off Asian […] therefore technically she is Asian.” 
Final 
“It is a snake because it said it ended up looking like a snake.” 
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Country of Origin/Culture 
An Asian person needs to have family or actually be themselves from Asia. You cannot change 
your nationality. 
Supernatural Power 
“God made you what you are. You can change the features but you're still the same as before.” 
“It is still Asian because you can't change the soul or spirit of a person.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
